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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
Nos. 05-1359 and 05-2231
__________
SOLANGE CHADDA,
                    Appellant
v.
ALLAN BURCKE; JEANINE GENDRECHI;
MARIA TUMOLO; QVC INC;
DIANE YOUNG
_____________________
Appeals From the United States District Court
For the Eastern  District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-04386)
District Judge:  Honorable Michael M. Baylson
________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 3, 2006
Before:    ROTH, RENDELL, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:   May 12, 2006)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
PER CURIAM
Solange Chadda appeals from the dismissal of her pro se complaint by the District
    1  Chadda’s initial untimely notice of appeal was docketed at C.A. No. 05-1359.  After
the District Court granted Chadda’s motion to extend the time to appeal, Chadda filed a
second notice of appeal docketed at C.A. No. 05-2231.  The two appeals have been
consolidated.
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1  We will affirm.
I.
In 2004, Chadda filed a complaint designated as an antitrust case and making
various allegations regarding the injuries she purportedly suffered from the use of a Diane
Young cosmetic sold by QVC, Inc.  Chadda subsequently filed an amended complaint
making additional allegations about the conduct of the defendants.  The District Court
first granted Diane Young’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Supplemental Appendix (“SAA”) 46-48.  The District Court
then granted the remaining defendants’, i.e., the QVC defendants’,  motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  SAA49.
II.
Our review of the District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary.  Green v.
America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir.) 2003.  We accept as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and “we draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id. 
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  The district courts have jurisdiction over federal
questions, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and actions involving parties of diverse citizenship and a
3minimum amount in controversy, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
A.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for a private cause of action for damages by
any person “injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws.”  15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  Although this statute provides a remedy for
consumers of goods or services for personal use, it does not encompass personal injuries. 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979);  see also 2660 Woodley Road Joint
Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp,  369 F.3d 732, 738 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a
private plaintiff  “must do more than simply show an injury causally linked to a violation
of the antitrust laws”; plaintiff  “must also prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, § 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes injunctive relief, but only for the threat of an
antitrust injury.  15 U.S.C. § 26;  In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395,
399 (3d Cir. 2000).  
We find that Chadda’s allegations, at most, assert personal injury.  Thus, in the
absence of the requisite injury to “business or property”, Chadda has not stated a claim
under the antitrust laws.  For the same reasons, Chadda’s allegations of racketeering do
not state a claim under the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”).  See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (only authorizing private cause of actions for persons
injured in their “business or property”);  Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503
U.S. 258, 267 (1992) (recognizing that the RICO civil private action provision was
    2  In her brief, Chadda also alleges violations of other commerce and trade statutes. See
Appellant’s Brief at 2-6, 8. However, because these claims were not raised in the District
Court we will not consider them on appeal.  See Ross v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant
Employees Int'l Union, 266 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2001).
    3  To the extent Chadda seeks to have a different District Court Judge assigned to the
case, see SAA142, 179, the request is denied as moot.
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modeled after § 4 of the Clayton Act).  Accordingly, Chadda’s complaint fails to state a
claim under the District Court’s federal question jurisdiction.2
B.
Chadda’s complaint also fails to satisfy the requirements for diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction.  Because Chadda alleges that she and all of the QVC defendants
are citizens of Pennsylvania, she fails to assert complete diversity of citizenship.  See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1);  Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that to satisfy § 1332(a)(1) jurisdiction no plaintiff can be a citizen of the
same state as any defendant).
III.
Accordingly, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Chadda’s
complaint, and we will therefore affirm.3
